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Abstract: Pricing schemes that vary prices in response to demand shocks may antagonize 
consumers and reduce demand. At the same time, consumers may take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by price changes.  Overall, the net impact of varying price on demand 
is ambiguous. We investigate the issue empirically, exploiting a unique dataset from a firm 
that has experimented with different pricing schemes. Each scheme is characterized by how 
much prices respond to demand variations.  Holding average price and other variables 
constant, we find that demand is higher when prices vary more.  The evidence suggests that 
the antagonism effect cannot be first order. 
 
 
JEL: D01, D12, L86. 
Keywords: Consumer demand, responsive pricing, fairness. 
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grant RES-000-22-1144, and participants in seminars at the Utrecht School of Economics, 
Roy Seminar, IUE, EARIE 2006, JEI 2006 as well as Christos Genakos, Stephan Fahr, Guy 
Laroque, Christopher Milde, and Frank Vella.  All remaining errors are ours.   1 Introduction    
Economic theory demonstrates that pricing schemes that vary prices in response to 
demand shocks could reduce rationing and increase welfare.  On the other hand, behavioral 
economics suggests that consumers care about how sellers set prices.  In particular, survey 
evidence shows that, in many contexts, consumers are antagonized by pricing schemes that 
change prices in response to fluctuations in demand (Kahneman et al., 1986).
3   
These opposite views have fueled a debate on the use and prevalence of innovative 
schemes that vary prices (e.g. Blinder et al. 1998, Borenstein et al. 2002, Rotemberg, 2004, 
Seidel et al. 2004). Lacking from the debate is systematic evidence from any industry of the 
impact of varying price on consumer demand.  Are consumers more likely to withhold 
consumption when firms vary prices in response to demand fluctuations?  Or does varying 
price increase demand?  
This paper develops a framework to measure the net impact on demand of introducing 
more flexible pricing schemes.  In contrast with the survey literature, which is based on 
consumer attitudes, we consider the impact of price variability on actual firm demand.  Since 
price variability may influence aggregate demand through other channels than just fairness, 
we state the question in terms of a simple trade-off.  When prices vary more, holding the 
overall level of prices and other variables constant, does the quantity demanded change?  If 
so, what is the trade-off (ceteris paribus) between the amount of price variations consumers 
face and overall quantity sold?   
We denote this trade off dq/dσ where q stands for average demand and σ for price 
variability.  While data constraints do not allow us to separately identify different sources of 
                                                      
3 In an early contribution based on a survey of managers, Hall and Hitch (1939, p.22) 
summarize that “changes in price ... are disliked by merchants and consumers.”  Later, Okun 
(1981, p.151) argues that “suppliers must beware of rocking the boat with their price actions”.  
Kahneman et al. (1986) conclude that “charging the market-clearing price for the most 
  1behavioral responses, we can measure the net effect of price variability on demand, and 
thereby, draw inference on which type of consumer response is unlikely to play a first order 
role.  In addition, the trade-off dq/dσ can shed some light on the debate on why firms often 
do not vary prices in response to demand shocks.  If dq/dσ≥0 and prices are correlated with 
demand, which is the case in situations where prices are used to smooth demand shocks, then 
revenue increases with the introduction of price variability.  Therefore, finding that dq/dσ≥0 
would reject the conjecture that the fear of revenue loss due to antagonized consumers is the 
explanation for the observation that firms do not vary prices.  
Measuring the trade-off dq/dσ is difficult in practice because one rarely observes 
consumer responses to pricing schemes that vary prices to different degrees in response to 
demand shocks.  Firms that use different pricing schemes usually differ in other important 
ways.  Moreover, firms rarely modify their pricing policies, and when they do so, it is 
usually done in conjunction with broader changes (e.g. product offers).    
We measure dq/dσ using a unique dataset from easyEverything, the largest chain of 
Internet cafés in the world.  While acknowledging that out-of-home Internet access is not of 
direct interest to economists, we believe that this case study nonetheless provides valuable 
insights for several reasons.  In contrast to the evidence used to support the conjecture that 
consumers are antagonized by variations in price, which is typically drawn from surveys, our 
case study provides the first evidence using actual demand responses.  Because the demand 
for Internet access varies over the day and is also unpredictable at any given hour, an 
Internet café fits the description of contexts where it has been argued that consumers may 
demonstrate price variation antagonism (Xia et al. 2004).
4   
                                                                                                                                                                      
popular goods would be judged unfair” (p.738).  See also Xia et al. (2004) for a review with a 
marketing perspective.  
4 Both Okun (1981) and Kahneman et al (1986) use the hotel industry to illustrate the 
conjecture that consumers may be antagonized by price variation.  Internet access is a service 
industry facing similar capacity management problems as the hotel industry.  
  2In addition, easyEverything has used both peak load pricing and responsive pricing, two 
pricing rules that have been shown to affect fairness perceptions and that, according to the 
literature mentioned earlier, should have an impact on demand.  Under responsive pricing, 
the firm updates prices every 5 minutes as a function of the realized occupancy rate in the 
store. Because it increases price when demand increases, and the magnitude of price changes 
is large, this pricing rule fits the description of exploitative and unfair firm behavior.   
Finally, the firm has experimented, for both peak load pricing and responsive pricing, 
with different pricing regimes that vary prices to different degrees. Since a large portion of 
sales involves repeat purchase, the behavioral hypothesis predicts that consumers should 
care about the pricing rule used (peak load pricing or responsive pricing) and that they 
should withhold demand when prices vary more.  These unique pricing experiments provide 
ideal conditions for measuring the impact of price variability on demand.  
We find that aggregate demand depends positively on the level of price variability while 
disaggregated (hourly) demand does not depend on the level of price variability.  Both 
findings are inconsistent with the behavioral conjecture that consumer antagonism plays a 
first order role in determining demand.  Instead, the evidence is consistent with a 
composition effect: when prices vary more, demand increases more when prices are low 
(off-peak hours) than it decreases when prices are high (peak hours).  This channel through 
which demand may depend on price variations has been largely ignored in the fairness 
literature.  Similarly, we do not find evidence in support of the antagonism hypothesis when 
we compare peak load pricing and responsive pricing.  Taken together, we interpret the 
finding that price variability increases, rather than decreases demand, as consumers taking 
advantage of opportunities offered by variation in prices. 
This work sheds new light on the role of fairness in explaining pricing policies.  Our 
results do not contradict the vast amount of evidence from surveys showing that consumer 
  3care about fairness, but suggest that there are other channels through which aggregate 
demand may depend on the extent to which prices respond to shocks.  The net impact of 
these different channels on demand is more complex than previously thought.          
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents our case study, 
the theoretical framework, and outlines the empirical strategy.  Section 3 describes the data.  
Section 4 presents the main evidence and discusses some implications of the results for firm 
pricing policies. Section 5 presents a brief summary.    
 
2 Background and Empirical Framework   
2-2 Literature 
The focus in this work is on price variations caused by changes in demand.  This choice 
is motivated by the finding that consumers feel more strongly toward price variability caused 
by demand than by supply fluctuations (Kahneman et al, 1986).  There are many situations 
in which prices may be linked to demand.  When demand is seasonal, for example, a firm 
can set different prices for different time periods.  This corresponds to deterministic peak 
load pricing.  When some component of the change in demand is unpredictable, firms may 
vary prices in real time, as in responsive pricing (Vickrey, 1971).
5    
Economists hold opposite views on the likely impact of varying prices.  Neo-classical 
models show that firms can use responsive pricing to reduces inefficiencies and/or increase 
profits. The basic idea is that increasing prices when demand is high reduces congestion and 
allocates the good to those consumers with highest willingness to pay.  Decreasing prices 
when demand is low stimulates demand, increases sales, and reduces wasted capacity.  The 
overall impact on welfare can be unambiguously positive.         
                                                      
5 The practice of varying prices could be motivated by the necessity to manage a fixed 
capacity efficiently in the presence of demand uncertainty but it is important to recognize that 
  4On the other hand, the behavioral literature argues that consumers are antagonized by 
price adjustments unrelated to changes in cost (Kahneman et al. 1986).
6  As a result, the 
argument goes, firms prefer to use inflexible allocation schemes, such as first-come first-
served, rather than varying prices because consumers would find such practices unfair and 
would withhold future demand.
7  Coca-Cola’s experience with responsive pricing provides 
an illustration.  In 1999, Coca-Cola began testing a vending machine with a temperature 
sensor and computer chip to determine when to automatically raise prices for its drinks in 
hot weather.  A public relation fiasco followed “causing Coke to promptly deny that it would 
ever have a vending machine do any such thing.”  (Washington Post, Wednesday 27 2000, p. 
A1).
8  Pursuing this line of research, the marketing literature has identified contexts where 
consumers are more likely to be antagonized (Xia et al., 2004).  It is argued that the context 
(type of product, consumer, and process dictating how prices change...) in which the 
transaction takes place is likely to influence consumers’ fairness perception.  For example, 
Haws and Bearden (2006) show that varying price is more acceptable when consumers play 
a role in the price determination process (e.g. eBay auction).   
                                                                                                                                                                      
this rationale is often undistinguishable from a pure profit maximization rationale leading to 
third degree price discrimination.       
6 Fairness in these survey studies refers to the acceptability of the transaction. This notion is 
different from the use that the word has received later in explicit theories of inter-individual 
comparisons.  In this paper we refer to the former notion. 
7 Kahneman et al., Proposition 2 (p. 738) says “when a supplier provides a family of goods for 
which there is differential demand without corresponding variation in input costs, shortage of 
the most valued items will occur”.  See also Carlton (1986). Consistent with this view, 
surveys of revenue managers reveal that firms are not willing to change prices because they 
are afraid to antagonize consumers (Blinder et al. 1998, and Zbaracki et al. 2004).  Rotemberg 
(2004) and Heidhues and Kőszegi (2005) assume that consumers are antagonized by unfair 
pricing, and propose theoretical models to investigate when firms may benefit from varying 
prices. 
8 Coca-Cola’s chief executive argued that the technology would cater to the basic law of 
supply and demand, as consumers’ desire for cold drinks increases in hot weather and each 
machine has a fixed capacity.  When the news became public, many were shocked by the 
proposal.  Pepsi was quick to state that it was not considering a similar innovation. 
  5This paper pursues a different although complementary approach.  We acknowledge 
the feature that transaction context may influence the degree of consumer antagonism.  
Consistent with this literature, we select a context with characteristics that are known to 
trigger fairness concerns, as we argue shortly. Within this context, we investigate whether 
there exists a trade-off between the amount of price variation and the level of demand.  
Because our approach focuses on measuring a trade-off, it could be replicated across 
contexts, a property regarded as essential by many (Fudenberg, 2006, Roth 2007).    
 
2-2 Empirical Framework 
Consider the demand relation  
q(p,ε)=F(p)+ε     (1) 
where ε is a zero mean demand shock that could either be random, as in the case of a 
snowstorm, or predictable, as in the case of seasonal changes in weather.  Relation (1) 
corresponds to the textbook demand relation between price and quantity sold.  To define the 
behavioral hypothesis, we restrict without loss of generality to the case where dF/dp is 
independent of the state of the world.  When we later discuss alternative types of consumer 
responses, we consider state dependent demands.  
Assume that prices depend on the demand shock. Specifically, the seller sets price P(ε) 
in state ε, where P() is a non-decreasing function. This stylized representation is consistent 
with a variety of pricing schemes used in practice.  If ε is seasonal, for example, prices could 
depend on the hour of the day, as in deterministic peak load pricing, a class of pricing 
scheme used in our case study.  If there exists an observable random variable τ that is 
correlated with ε then prices could be a function of τ, as in the Coke example, where τ is 
temperature.  Finally, prices could depend on ε indirectly through q, as would be the case 
under responsive pricing.  easyEverything has also used this class of pricing scheme in our 
  6case study: A non-decreasing pricing function specifies a price for each level of store 
occupancy.  Occupancy is measured every 5 minutes and the price is automatically updated 
according to 
P(q)=α+βq    (2) 
where P(q) is the price per unit of time and q is the measured level of occupancy (fraction of 
terminals logged on).  A pricing scheme is more responsive if it has a higher slope β.  Two 
pricing schemes are illustrated in Figure 1. Under scheme P1(q) the price is constant 
throughout the day independently of demand realizations.  Scheme P2(q) is responsive: 
Consumers are charged more when there are more consumers logged on.    
 
Behavioral Hypothesis 
We modify demand specification (1) to capture the behavioral hypothesis that 
consumers might care about the properties of the rule that is used to set prices.  To do so, we 
first define a measure of fairness so that pricing regimes can be compared and rated.  
Following the behavioral literature, we hypothesize that a pricing regime that varies prices 
more should be perceived as less fair.  We denote by σ the measure of how much prices vary 
under pricing rule P().  For example, one could think of σ as the variance of price 
(Var[(P(ε)]), but this choice is somewhat arbitrary, and other measures of variability should 
not be ruled out.
9  The important point is that any measure of price variability, such as σ, 
captures the notion of exploitation implicit in fairness perception, because more price 
variability implies, under the assumption that P is increasing in ε, that prices increase more 
when demand is higher.   
                                                      
9 Note that fairness considerations may be multi-dimensional.  In particular, it may also 
depend directly on the rule used to set prices (e.g. peak load pricing versus responsive 
pricing). This would suggest that one may want to supplement our measure of price variability 
  7According to behavioral survey evidence, a consumer should be more likely to buy 
from sellers that use pricing rules with low σ, holding ‘everything else’ constant, including 
the expected price of the good, and other characteristics of the pricing rule such as how it is 
presented or ‘framed’ to the consumer.  One way to motivate this assumption within the 
framework of standard utility theory would be to assume that fairness is an additional 
characteristic of the good that enters the utility function.  In the same way that consumers 
may care about the physical characteristics of a product and about softer dimensions such as 
brand, convenience, or availability, one could hypothesize that consumers also care about the 
fairness of the transaction rules that govern how a product is allocated.       
We propose to extend relation (1) to the possibility that the demand could depend on 
the level of price variation, 
q(P,ε)=F(P(ε),σ)+ε     (3)       
where the function q(.,.) gives the level of demand in state ε when prices are set according to 
pricing rule P.  Demand function q(P,ε) captures two relations.  Holding the level of price 
variability σ constant, the demand decreases as prices increase, dF/dP(ε)≤0. This 
corresponds to the standard demand relation already present in (2). Functional form (3) also 
makes it possible to compare pricing regimes that vary prices to different degrees.  
Translating the behavioral hypothesis to this framework, we say that consumers are 
antagonized by price variations, if the demand responds negatively to an increase in the 
amount of price variations holding the state price constant, dF/dσ<0.  
Functional form (3) assumes that consumers know the extent to which prices vary.  
This assumption may be reasonable in the case of deterministic peak load pricing.  When 
prices vary for random reasons, as in the Coke example and in responsive pricing as well, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
σ with additional measures that captures those fairness considerations.  We will return to this 
issue in the context of our case study. 
  8this assumption is obviously a simplification of reality, since in practice different consumers 
go through different purchasing experiences that may influence their perceptions of how 
much prices actually vary. Keeping this limitation in mind, the proposed approach rests on 
the assumption that price variability captures some aspect related to the consumer’s 
perception of fairness.
10  
The parameter of interest is dF/dσ.  Clearly, the variable σ is constant for a given 
pricing regime.  To estimate dF/dσ, one needs to observe exogenous variations in the pricing 
function P that generate variations in σ.  For example, a firm could change its pricing 
policies over time, as in our case study, or different firms could adopt different policies.  
Assume one observes different pricing rules that depend on a parameter vector γ and denote 
this relation P(ε;γ).  For example, γ=(α,β) in our application (equation (2)).   Exogenous 
variations in γ generate different levels of price variation, opening the possibility to estimate 
dF/dσ.   
Specification (3) can be restated in terms of expected demand. Let q(ε;γ) denote the 
consumed quantity in state ε when the price is set according to pricing rule γ. Take a first 
order approximation of (3) around the mean price EεP(ε;γ) in regime γ (where Eε is the 
expectation taken over all realizations of the shock ε).  Replacing F(p,σ)≈F(EεP(ε;γ),σ)+(p- 
EεP(ε;γ))*Fp and taking expectations under the assumption that Fp is constant across states 
gives,  
Eεq(ε;γ)≈F(EεP(ε;γ),σ)    (4) 
where Eεq(ε;γ) represents the average level of consumption for regime γ.  Specification (4) 
captures the basic idea that when the average cost of consumption is held constant, the 
                                                      
10 An alternative approach to model fairness, which we cannot pursue in this work, would be 
to assume that a given consumer, with a given consumption profile, cares only about the 
variation in price she faces.  For example, a consumer who consumes only in a subset of the 
  9average quantity demanded should be lower for pricing regimes that vary prices more.  To 
illustrate, consider the Coke example.  Interpret q as the number of bottles sold in a given 
period. Functional form (4) distinguishes between a situation where the price of a bottle is 
constant, p=p0 and σ=0 (standard vending machine) with a situation where the price is on 
average the same, Ep=p0, but is higher on hot days σ>0 (the innovation proposed by 
Coke).
11   
 
Alternative Hypothesis 
The reduced form approach implicit in specification (3) and (4) has advantages as well 
as limitations.  The main drawback is that it may not permit to pin down of a unique 
behavioural mechanism through which demand may depend on price variability.  More 
precisely, behavioral theory is not be the only theory that makes prediction on the sign of 
dF/dσ.  To illustrate, consider again the example of a vending machine varying prices as a 
function of temperature. If consumers care about price variations only because they are 
antagonized by price variations, then one would expect that dF/dσ<0.  There are, however, 
alternative explanations as to why the demand may depend on unpredictable price variations:  
(1)  Consumers may be risk averse.  Risk aversion would imply that demand 
should also depend negatively on σ.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
states of the world will face a different distribution of prices from a consumer who always 
consumes.   
11 Specification (4) and the above illustration highlight the distinction between price variation 
antagonism as defined in this paper and the concept of fairness introduced in Kahneman et al. 
(1986).  We ask a different question from those typically posed in consumer surveys. Our 
study focuses on consumer responses to changes in the level of price variability when holding 
the level of price constant, rather than on a single price increase triggered by a positive 
demand shock.  
  10(2)  Consumers may update their consumption decisions after observing the 
realized price. A risk neutral consumer values price variability.
12  If this were the only 
channel through which consumers respond, it could be possible that dF/dσ >0.
13     
(3)  Most importantly, demand may be state dependent, a possibility not allowed 
by specification (1).  For example, consider the more general specification,  
q(p,ε)=F(p,σ;ε)              (5) 
and assume that demand is less elastic in higher states: F is increasing in ε and dF/dp 
decreases with ε, a reasonable assumption in our application as we will argue later.  When 
prices vary more across states (an increase in σ), demand increases more in low states than it 
decreases in high ones.  This implies that average demand responds positively to price 
variations.     
  
2-3 Summary 
Specifications (3-5) serve three purposes well.  First, they provide a descriptive tool to 
characterize (aggregate) demand responses to pricing policies that generate different levels 
of price variability.  Arguably, the extent to which price variations affect the demand 
function is of interest in itself. We can measure the sign of dF/dσ and establish the existence 
of a trade-off between the level of price and price variability.   
                                                      
12 Consider the simplest case where the consumer utility is U(m,φ(x))=m+φ(x) where m is a 
composite good, x is the good under consideration, and φ is increasing and concave.  The 
consumer maximizes U subject to budget constraint m+px=I.   Let V(p)=I-pX(p)+φ(X(p)) 
represent the indirect utility function where X(p) is defined by φ'(X(p))=p.  Since the indirect 
utility is convex in price (V''(p)=-X'(p)=-1/φ''(X(p))>0) we have V(p)<E(V(p)). Therefore, 
expected utility increases with the degree of price variations.   
13 To illustrate that this conclusion does not always follow, assume that only consumers with 
positive expected utility (E(V(p))) consume. Total consumption is the sum of individual 
consumption EX(p) for all consumers who have positive utility.  Although the number of 
consumers increases with the variance of price, actual consumption may increase or decrease.  
dF/dσ>0 is possible but not necessary. 
  11Second, specifications (3) and (4) can be used to test whether consumer antagonism 
toward price variation plays ‘a first order role’ as suggested by the behavioral literature. We 
will interpret the finding that dF/dσ<0 as consistent with the behavioral hypothesis of 
consumer antagonism. Alternatively, the finding that dF/dσ≥0 implies that the consumer 
antagonism hypothesis cannot be first order.       
Third, the measure dq/dσ can shed some light on the hypothesis that firms do not vary 
prices because they fear antagonizing consumers.  Say that one finds that dq/dσ≥0 in an 
industry where firms typically do not vary prices.  Since the pricing schemes we consider 
generate a positive correlation between occupancy and price, expected revenues must 
increase with the introduction of price variations.  To illustrate this point, consider the class 
of pricing rules used in our case study corresponding to specification (1).  Firm revenues can 
be expressed as  
R=E[q(ε;γ)P(ε;γ)]=Cov(q(ε;γ),P(ε;γ))+Eq(ε;γ)EP(ε;γ) 
=βVarq(ε;γ)+Eq(ε;γ)EP(ε;γ) 
If dEq(ε;γ)/dσ≥0, the introduction of price variations that holds the level of price constant 
clearly increases revenues, R, since the first term becomes positive (it is zero under constant 
price (β=0)) and the second increases by assumption.
14  To summarize, the finding that 
firms’ demand is such that dEq(ε;γ)/dσ≥0 in an industry where firms do not vary prices 
implies that the fear of demand withholding by antagonized consumers cannot be an 
explanation for the observation that prices do not vary.   
 
3 Data 
                                                      
14The prediction dR/dσ|EP≥0 holds more generally for any increase in price variation that 
holds the level of price constant as long as the covariance Cov(q(ε;γ),P(ε;γ)) also increases 
with the increase in price variations, a reasonable assumption since we restrict the analysis to 
schemes that increase/decrease prices when demand is high/low.  
  12Our data set consists of the pricing policies and the average hourly occupancy for one 
of the easyEverything Internet cafés in Paris (Paris Sebastopole) from the store opening on 
January 19, 2001, to July 23, 2001. During this period, store capacity remained fixed at 373 
terminals, and the store’s competitive environment did not change.  The firm has used two 
different pricing rules: peak-load pricing from January 19 to February 21 and, later, a 
combination of responsive pricing from 8 am till midnight and peak load pricing during the 
night.  Our sample comprises the store’s experiments with 17 consecutive pricing regimes: 5 
under peak-load pricing, and 12 under responsive pricing. Each peak-load pricing regime 
specifies a day cycle of up to 24 prices. Each responsive pricing regime is characterized by 
its intercept α and slope β as in equation (2).
15  Under responsive pricing, prices are 
communicated to consumers, who are charged in real time the minimum of the current price 
and their logon price.   
After opening a new store, the company experiments with different pricing 
functions, typically starting off with peak load pricing and then introducing responsive 
pricing, to learn the specific characteristics of the local demand before attempting to 
optimise the pricing scheme (Courty and Pagliero, 2001).  Table 1 shows that the firm has 
changed the price cycle under peak load pricing and the slope of the pricing functions under 
responsive pricing. Changes to the pricing functions provide the exogenous variability in 
level of price variation that is used in the estimation.  In fact, Table 1 shows that there is no 
predictable pattern in the timing of change of regimes or in the length of the regimes.  
                                                      
15 Because of implementation constraints, the store had to use step functions instead of 
continuous functions. On average there are 30 steps per curve, with a minimum of 15.  We 
compute linear approximations of the pricing curves by regressing the price at each step on 
the occupancy rate at the midpoint. Steps that are never reached during the regime are 
excluded from the regression.  The average slope, corresponding to β, is 17.1—meaning that 
the price decreases by FRF 1.71 each time occupancy decreases by 10 percent (or 37 
computers).  In all but three regimes, a linear approximation of the pricing curve explains 
more than 95 percent of the variation.  In regimes 12, 13, and 14, the R
2 is between 0.75 and 
  13Given the strong cyclical patterns in demand in our sample (according to time of day and 
day of the week), one would have expected to find clear patterns (such as daily or weekly 
regime changes) if the introductions had indeed responded to demand fluctuations.
16  The 
responsiveness of the pricing functions tends to increase over time, but there are also many 
variations, and our results are robust after controlling for a time trend. 
The occupancy data consists of hourly average occupancy rates for 186 days. 
(easyEverything did not collect consumption information at the individual level.) Overall, 
our dataset consists of 4,143 hourly observations.
17  Table 1 reports summary statistics. The 
average occupancy rate in the sample is 46 percent of store capacity, with a standard 
deviation of 19 percent.  A feature that will play a role in interpreting the results is that the 
capacity never binds in our sample.  This implies that quantity demanded equals quantity 
consumed.  
The average price per hour is FRF 10.7 (€ 1.63) and the price variance is 28.7 
FRF
2/hour. This amount of price variability is significant. In fact, the standard deviation of 
price is 51% of the average price.  The difference between the 90th and 10th percentile is 
FRF 14.8 (€ 2.26).  The 90th percentile (FRF 18.18 or € 2.77) of the price distribution is 
more than five times higher than the 10th percentile (FRF 3.33 or € 0.51).  These levels of 
price variability are also high relative to those discussed in the literature. As a comparison, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
0.87.  These regimes are piecewise linear, with a kink at 60 percent. These non-linearities do 
not affect our results. 
16 Two additional points are worth mentioning.  First, shortly after the end of our sample 
period, the company decided to change its pricing strategy and store layout, because it could 
not maintain high levels of occupancy while also holding prices above a level that would 
cover average costs.  According to the managers, this decision was deliberately taken after the 
end of the experimentation period and was based on the information collected during this first 
phase. Second, our exogeneity assumption would hold even if the company designed new 
regimes using information learned from past ones, at least so long as the demand environment 
did not change throughout the period. 
17 The raw occupancy data include breakdown periods during which the system crashed. In 
such events, all computers have to be restarted and the hourly occupancy average shows a 
  14the snowstorm question in Kahneman et al. (1986) related to an increase in price of 33 
percent. 
 
Do consumers face price variation? 
The type of price variation introduced by easyEverything falls within our empirical 
framework and qualifies to test the behavioral hypothesis that consumers are antagonized by 
schemes that increase prices in response to demand shocks.  To illustrate, the variance in 
price by regime presented in Table 1 can be interpreted as the variability in logon price 
experienced by a consumer who joins the store at a random hour every day.  These variances 
capture the fact that prices vary over the day cycle and also that they vary across days for the 
same hour due, for example, to changes in weather, start of school vacation, occurrence of 
strike and so on... 
In principle, consumers may assess fairness on basis of the variability of billed price, 
which may differ from the login price due to the price cap feature, but computing this figure 
would require consumer level data. The difference in the variability of the two prices, 
however, is likely to be small for most consumers because prices do not vary much over the 
typical length of stay.  (The level of price at the start of a session may still be uncertain 
because it depends on the level of demand on that day.)  In fact, a smaller dataset on length 
of stay shows that consumers remain connected on average for 65 minutes.  In addition, 
prices vary little across consecutive hours, compared to the overall price variability. Table 
A1 in Appendix I shows that the average price increase between adjacent hours is 1.73FRF, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
sudden drop. Using an additional data set on downtime periods, we removed all corresponding 
observations. 
  15that is only 1/3 of the overall standard deviation of price.
18  In the rest of the analysis, will 
use the variations in login price as our measure of the price variation.   
 
Should consumers respond to changes in pricing regimes?  
Two types of changes have taken place during our sample period.  First, the 
distribution of price changes from regime to regime.  Second, the store has switched from 
peak load pricing to responsive pricing after regime 5.  Because there was no other change in 
the pricing policies during our sample period, we can focus exclusively on these two 
dimensions holding constant other behavioral considerations such as framing.   
The level of price variation changes from regime to regime.  In fact, the differences in 
variance across regimes, reported in Table 1, are large and statistically significant (see Table 
A2 in Appendix I).  This implies that a consumer who joins the store at a random hour every 
day will face more price uncertainty under more responsive pricing regimes.  Although 
consumers may not join the store every day we would expect a response if there is enough 
repeat purchase which is the case in our case study.  Based on survey data, the store manager 
reported that a large fraction of users come regularly to the store and on average half of them 
visit the store at least 3 times a week. 
Comparing different pricing regimes, for a given type of pricing rule (peak load or 
responsive), falls within our empirical framework.  Changes in the level of price variability 
across regimes of the same type, allow us to estimate dF/dσ<0.  Comparing demand across 
pricing regimes that belong to a different type may involve additional considerations such as 
the possibility that framing may have changed from peak load to responsive pricing.  We 
will take this possibility into account in the empirical analysis.   
                                                      
18 Table 1 reports the overall price variance, 28.73 FRF
2, which implies a standard deviation 
of 5.36 FRF. 
  16A final issue is that under responsive pricing, consumers do not observe directly when 
the pricing function changes, or the overall distribution of price.  Prices, however, are posted 
on a small window on each terminal, and are updated every 5 minutes. Consumers can 
observe occupancy in the store and up to 12 prices every hour, so they have sufficient 
information for inferring the pricing function.  For linear pricing functions, in principle it 
takes only two non-identical observations on price and occupancy to back up the parameters 
(α,β).  In practice, however, consumers may not immediately respond to changes in regime.  
We investigate the possibility of transition periods between regimes in Section 4.3.    
 
4 Demand Responses to Price Variations 
The empirical objective is to describe the relationship between quantity demanded, 
price, and price variability (relations (3) and (4)) in a way that is robust to the specification 
used.  The exogenous variations in the level of prices under peak load pricing and in the 
parameters of the pricing function (α, β) under responsive pricing generate exogenous 
variations in the level of prices and the level of price variation.  This opens up the possibility 
of estimating how variations in these variables affect the level of demand.   
As mentioned earlier, the price elasticity of demand for Internet access is likely to be 
hour dependent.  Therefore one needs to consider the possibility of hour heterogeneity 
(specification 5).  We consider both a specification where we aggregate all hours of the day 
and also a disaggregated specification.  The former specification gives the overall impact of 
price variation on demand while the latter gives the net impact after controlling for hour 
heterogeneity. Our primary specification corresponds to a linearization of model (4)  
j i j i j j j i j I i j u x a a p a a q ,..., 1 , 17 ,..., 1 ' , , 3 2 1 0 , = = + + + + = σ        (6) 
where qj,i is the i
th occupancy observation in regime j, pj is a price index for regime j, and  j σ  
is a measure of price variability in regime j; xj,i is a vector of control variables including 
  17indicator variables for day of the week (Tuesday to Sunday) and national holidays; uj,i is an 
error term.
19
We later consider a more disaggregated specification than (6), introducing hour fixed 
effects (a0,h) and hour-specific average prices (pj,h). We also explore non-linear 
specifications.  Finally, there are many ways to construct the right-hand side variables in 
specification (6).  We present the main results (Table 2) using a first set of right-hand side 
variables that we describe shortly. In subsection 4.3 we then show that these results are 
robust.  
The price index pj is computed as follows. We use the subscript h=0,...,23 to denote 
hours. Define pj,h as the average price in hour h in regime j and wh as the fraction of total 
consumption in the sample that takes place in hour h.  The price index in regime j is 
pj=Σhwhpj,h.  Consider next the measure of fairness,  j σ .  We use the variance in price 
computed at the regime level to measure how fair a pricing regime is. Under peak load 
pricing, this corresponds to the variance in the daily price cycle. Under responsive pricing, it 
mixes night hourly prices, when prices are fixed, and the realized prices during the day.  As 
suggested earlier, there is no perfect measure of fairness in our case study because 
consumers are characterized by unique purchase histories that influence their perceptions of 
fairness. Having said this, however, it also seems plausible that price variance should capture 
some common aspect of fairness that consumers are likely to be concerned with. 
The two right-hand side variables pj and   in specification  (6) may not depend only 
on the parameters of the pricing function.  They may also depend on the error term.  To 
illustrate, recall that the variables p
j σ
j and   are computed using observed prices.  Under  j σ
                                                      
19 Model (4) says that average occupancy (over all observations in a given regime) should be a 
function of average price (pj) and price variability ( j σ ). However, observations in model (6) 
  18responsive pricing, these variables are a function of the occupancy observations (through 
relation (2)) and may be correlated with the error term.  In addition, because we use a finite 
number of observations for each regime, these variables are imperfect measures of the true pj 
and   which should be based on the distribution of the demand shocks (ε in the model).  
Measurement error in p
j σ
j and   may also generate correlation between the regressors and 
the error term.  To deal with this endogeneity problem, we use the parameters of the pricing 




20 Table A3 in Appendix I 
reports the first stage regression results. The instruments are highly correlated with the price 
level and the price variability.  
 
4-1 Main Results 
Overall Response (TABLE 2, COLUMN 1) 
Table 2, column 1 presents the results of specification (6). Consistent with standard 
economic theory, the coefficient estimating the response to the price index is negative and 
significant, giving a price elasticity of 0.26.  Allowing for hourly price responses (column 2) 
implies price elasticities as high as 0.9.
21  This rules out the possibility that one should not 
expect antagonism responses in our case study because consumers are price insensitive.    
However, the focus of this work is on a2.  The coefficient estimating the response to 
price variations is positive and significant.  Holding the price index constant, higher 
                                                                                                                                                                      
are not averaged at the regime level because the control variables xj,i are hour and day 
specific. 
20 The variables pj and  are likely to depend not only on the parameters of the pricing 
function α and β but also on their square α
j σ
2 and β
2.  To demonstrate this point, solve (2) and 
(3) for the price in state ε as P(ε)=α+βq(P(ε),ε).  For example, if the function q is linear in 
both its argument, the solution P(ε) is non linear in β.  Clearly, the variance is a non-linear 
function of P and therefore of α and β.  
21 At 9am, dq/dp=-2.8 (see Table 2, column 2), the average price is 9.15FF and the average 
occupancy rate is 27.98%. 
  19variability of prices is associated with higher consumption.  Consider a switch from a 
hypothetical regime that generates the minimum price variance observed in our sample (0.17 
FRF
2/hour) to another hypothetical regime that generates the largest price variability 
observed in our sample (57.5 FRF
2/hour). At the aggregate level, the results in Table 2, 
column 1, suggest that consumption increases by 5.6 percent of store capacity, or 12 percent 
of average observed occupancy. 
We rule out an obvious explanation for this effect. The increase in consumption could 
be due to a binding capacity effect.  If the capacity binds, then increasing price variations 
while maintaining a constant average price increases consumption in low demand states, but 
does not decrease consumption in high demand states.  We rule out this interpretation 
because the capacity never binds in our sample.  To conclude, the positive demand response 
to increases in price variation rules out the hypothesis that antagonism responses play a first 
order role in our data.   
 
Disaggregate Specification (TABLE 2, COLUMN 2) 
Table 2, column 2 controls for heterogeneity across hours by including hour specific 
fixed effects a0,h and hour specific price coefficients a1,h in model (6),  
j
i h j i h j h j h j h h i h j
I i h j
u x a a p a a a q
,..., 1 , 23 ,..., 0 , 17 ,..., 1
' , , , , , 3 2 , , 1 , 0 0 , ,
= = =
+ + + + + = σ
            (7) 
where pj,h is the average price in regime j and hour h; xj,h,i includes the same control 
variables as before along with the weekend-specific hourly price cycle.
22  To motivate this 
specification, write model (5) as qh(p,ε)=Fh(p,σ)+ε and take a first order approximation.   
The coefficient on price variation   is smaller and not significantly different from zero. 
This suggests that the estimate of   in column 1 captured a demand composition effect 
2 a
2 a
  20similar to the one described as an illustration of specification (5). To explain this effect in the 
context of our case study, assume that different consumers come at the peak and at the 
trough (demand heterogeneity) and that peak consumers are less price sensitive than off-
peak consumers (a realistic assumption as we argue next).  More responsive pricing regimes 
increase the difference between peak and off-peak prices. Therefore, peak consumers 
consume less and off-peak consumers more, but the latter effect dominates the former, 
holding the price index constant.  Consistent with this interpretation, we find that demand is 
more sensitive off-peak than at the peak.  In fact, consumption is highest in our sample from 
4pm to 7pm (peak hours), and the marginal effect of a change in the hourly average price is 
lower than during off-peak hours – morning or late evening. Varying price stimulates 
consumption more during off-peak hours than it chokes off demand during peak hours.  
 
Summary 
Aggregate demand depends positively on the level of price variability while 
disaggregated demand does not. Pricing schemes that vary prices more do not reduce 
consumption (Table 2, columns 1 and 2). This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
consumer antagonism to price variations plays a first order role.  The positive effect of price 
variability on aggregate consumption is consistent with a composition effect due to demand 
heterogeneity.  In the rest of this section, we show that this conclusion is robust to the way 
we capture price variation antagonism and to different demand specifications. 
 
4-2 Controlling for Different Sources of Price Variability 
Specification (6) focuses exclusively on the role of price variability.  This implicitly 
rules out the possibility that demand could depend directly on the pricing rule used. Recall 
                                                                                                                                                                      
22 Under peak load pricing, the average price pj,h corresponds to the predetermined price for 
  21that two pricing rules, peak load pricing and responsive pricing, were used in our sample. 
Consumers may perceive these two rules in different ways.  In fact, survey evidence suggests 
that consumers care about the rule that generates price variability.  For example, Frey and 
Pommerehne (1993, p.303) consider the case of a sightseeing point where a limited supply of 
cool drinking water is sold to thirsty hikers. Assuming excess demand due to hot weather, 
they make the distinction between: “How do you evaluate a price rise when a hot day was 
completely unforeseeable?” and “Do you consider a price rise ... to be more, equally, or less 
acceptable than when hot days normally occur in the season considered?”  Their findings 
suggest that consumers are less likely to be antagonized by predictable price variations (as in 
peak load pricing) than by unpredictable price variations generated by unpredictable demand 
shocks (as in responsive pricing);  (64% of subjects find the former rule more acceptable 
than the latter).  This suggests that we should treat peak load pricing and responsive pricing 
differently.
23  In this section, we explore variations of model (6) and (7), allowing for the 
demand to depend in more general ways on the pricing rule. 
 
Responsive Pricing Fixed Effect  
Table 3, column 1 introduces a fixed effect for responsive pricing.  The motivation for 
the fixed effect is that consumers may respond differently to peak load pricing and 
responsive pricing.  In fact, responsive pricing explicitly links prices to demand realizations, 
making prices unpredictable.  According to the conclusion of Frey and Pommerehne (1993, 
p.303), one would expect the fixed effect for responsive pricing to be negative if fairness 
concerns are first order. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that hour. 
23 In responsive pricing regimes the amount of unpredictable price variability is significant: 7 
percent of price variance (corresponding to approximately 25% in terms of standard 
deviation) cannot be explained by a regime specific daily price cycle. Assuming additional 
  22Table 3, column 2 includes a measure of price variability as well, as in Table 2, column 
1. Table 3, column 3 allows for hourly heterogeneity as in Table 2, column 2.  The fixed 
effect is positive and significant in all three specifications.  This suggests that varying price 
in real time does not decrease demand.  This is again inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
antagonism responses play a first order role in our data. In Table 3, column 2, the coefficient 
of price variability is again positive and significantly different from zero.  As before, we find 
that after controlling for hourly heterogeneity, this effect is not significantly different from 
zero (as in Table 2).  
Results in Table 3 raise the question of why the fixed effect is positive. A potential 
interpretation for this finding follows the line of the explanation for why price variability 
influences aggregate, and not disaggregated, consumption, in Table 2. Holding the expected 
hourly price constant, responsive pricing increases prices when demand is higher and, 
presumably, less price sensitive. This generates a positive effect of increasing price 
variability on demand.  In order to test the hypothesis that the demand is less price sensitive 
when the demand is higher, one would have to disaggregate the hourly demand and estimate 
the price response in different states of the world.
24,25     
 
Peak Load versus Responsive Price Variability 
One could argue that consumption may respond differently to price variation generated 
by different pricing rules. The results of Table 2 may confound two opposing effects 
                                                                                                                                                                      
variables (such as day of the week and National Holiday fixed effects) are used by consumers 
to predict prices reduces only marginally the amount of unpredictable price variability. 
24 Under some functional assumption on the state demands, one can use a quantile framework 
to estimate the state demands.  Consistent with the above interpretation, Courty and Pagliero 
(2003) find that the state demands are less price sensitive when demand is higher.  
25 Another possible explanation is that the introduction of responsive pricing was framed 
differently than peak load pricing, for example, emphasizing differently consumer benefits 
and losses.  Although we cannot explore this hypothesis with our data, there is no indication 
that this was the case from reviewing store posters and advertising pamphlets. 
  23generated by peak load pricing and responsive pricing. Therefore, we allow price variability 
to have a different impact on demand during the peak load pricing and the responsive pricing 
periods.  Table 4, columns 1 and 2 report the aggregate and disaggregate results respectively.  
The effect of price variability is never negative. During responsive pricing regimes, it is 
significantly different from zero in the aggregate specification (column 1). In the 
disaggregated specification (column 2), the effect of price variability is not significant for 
responsive pricing nor for peak load pricing.  Again, the evidence is not consistent with the 




In this section we explore a set of variations of model (6) and (7) in order to investigate 
the robustness of the baseline results reported in Table 2. We deal with substitution effects, 
functional form assumptions, the definition of right-hand side variables (weighted price and 
price variability), sample definition, and time trend. 
 
Substitution effects 
Table 5 accounts for substitution across hours by extending specification (7). In 
principle, it might be desirable to include in the specification for each hour the average price 
in every other hour, since substitution may occur between any hour. However, due to data 
limitations, we have to aggregate different hours to limit the number of coefficients that need 
to be estimated.  
We group observations in our sample into two broad periods: "peak", from 11am to 10 
pm, and "off-peak", from 11pm to 10 am such that the actual peak and trough are roughly in 
the middle of these two periods. We allow consumption in each of the two groups to be a 
  24function of the average price in the other group. In order to further reduce the number of 
parameters to be estimated, we assume symmetry in the substitution effects across groups. 
Of course there are other ways of aggregating the observations, but the results are not 
significantly affected.  
Specification (7), there is one additional variable capturing substitution between peak 
and off-peak hours, 
j
i h j h j i h j h j h j h h i h j
I i h j
u p a x a a p a a a q
,..., 1 , 23 ,..., 0 , 17 ,..., 1
~ ' , , , 4 , , , 3 2 , , 1 , 0 0 , ,
= = =
+ + + + + + = σ
          (8) 
h j p ,
~  is equal to the average off-peak price if  23 11 ≤ ≤ h  and to the average peak price 
otherwise; a4 is a parameter to be estimated. Clearly, the new variable  h j p ,
~  may be 
correlated with the error term. Exogenous variation in the pricing function provides 
exogenous variation in the relative price across periods. This allows estimation of a4.  
Table 5, column 1 reports the results of model (9). Table 5, columns 2 and 3 are the 
extension of the results in Table 3, column 3 (responsive pricing fixed effect), and Table 4, 
column 2 (different sources of price variability). The substitution effect in Table 5 tends to 
be negative and not significantly different from zero. The main results discussed in the 
previous section, however, are unchanged.  
 
Other Robustness Results 
Tables 6 and 7 report aggregate and disaggregate specifications respectively. The former 
reports variations of model (6) and the latter reports variations of model (7).  
(1)  In column 1,Tables 6-7, price variability is measured by its standard deviation, 
rather than its variance, to check robustness to different measures of variability. The 
signs of the coefficients of price variability are not different from the results in 
Table 2. 
  25(2)  In column 2, Table 6, pj
2 is included to control for non-linear effects of the price 
level.  This specification allows for more general demand heterogeneity. In column 
2, Table 7, the specification includes pjh
2. The signs of the effects of total variance 
are the same.   
(3)  In column 3, Tables 6-7, the dependent variable is the log of the occupancy rate. 
This specification tests the robustness of the results to a non-linear specification. 
The marginal effect of a change in variance on occupancy rate is still positive and 
significant in Table 6, and non significant in Table 7. 
These first three robustness checks also show that it is unlikely that, in Table 2, the variance 
in price captured non-linear price effects. 
(4)  In column 4, Tables 6-7, hourly observations in the 24 hours after each regime 
change are excluded from the sample. Such deletion is motivated by the possibility 
that it may take time for consumers to adjust to a regime change. In fact, our 
empirical analysis assumes that consumers know the average level of price and the 
amount of price variability. This is a realistic assumption in our case study, as 
consumers tend to visit the store regularly. Still, we test the robustness of the results 
by excluding those observations for which transition effects could play a role. Both 
aggregate and disaggregate results are not significantly affected.   
(5)  In column 5, Tables 6-7, the sample is restricted to the responsive pricing regimes 
(regimes 6-17). This is because peak load pricing may be perceived differently from 
responsive pricing and the results in Table 2 may be driven by the aggregation of 
the two different time periods. The coefficient of price variability is again positive 
and significant in the aggregate specification, and non significant in the 
disaggregate specification.  
  26(6)  Table 6, column 6 reports the results when the price index pj is constructed as the 
(un-weighted) average price within each regime.  
(7)  Another concern is that there may be a trend in demand during our sample period.  
Column 5, Tables 6-7, which excludes the first month following the launch of the 
store and focuses on the following five months, already suggests that the results are 
not driven by a change in demand after the first month. To further investigate the 
effects of a possible trend in demand, in column 6, Table 7, we use the same 
specification as in column 5, Table 7, but we also include a linear-quadratic trend 
(the week number from the beginning of the sample and its square). The marginal 
effect of the trend is negative and relatively small.
26  The results are not affected.   
 
4-4 Implications for Firm Pricing Policies 
Our case study presents a situation where prices change significantly in response to 
demand shocks, but these variations in price have no negative impact on aggregate demand.  
Our evidence suggests that varying prices can influence overall demand through several 
channels. While survey evidence demonstrates the importance of antagonism responses, we 
show that in practice the demand composition effect can dominate. To repeat, this does not 
imply that the antagonism effect does not exist, nor that it never plays a first order role.     
We recognize that our approach has limitations. First, the evidence presented is specific 
to our case study, and consumer attitude toward price variations may be different in different 
markets so one must be cautious in generalizing our results to different contexts. However, 
our case fits the description of situations where it has been conjectured that antagonism 
caused by demand driven price variation should be significant.  Second, it is possible that 
only a small proportion of consumers is not antagonized by price variability and that this 
                                                      
26 The coefficients imply an average decrease in occupancy of 0.7 percent per week. 
  27group is over-represented in our case study.  Still, we find no margin from increasing the 
amount of price variation, and in addition, we find no additional impact from switching to a 
pricing rule that changes prices in real time, although both changes are perceived as 
exploitative in surveys.  Third, our findings do not imply that firms should necessarily 
introduce responsive pricing.  Profits do not necessarily increase with price variability.  In 
fact, it could be the case that the costs of implementing responsive pricing schemes outweigh 
the benefits. 
Our evidence does not support the hypothesis that increasing price variation in response 
to demand shocks would necessarily alienate consumers and decrease revenue.  This leaves 
at least two candidates behavioral explanations for the observation that firms do not vary 
prices and that consumers show significant fairness concerns when asked to give their 
opinion about price variations.  First, there may be a discontinuity between constant price 
and variable price and all antagonism responses may take place there.  We cannot test this 
hypothesis because the firm in our case study has never experimented with constant prices.  
Second, consumers may be sensitive to the means of communicating the rules used to set 
prices.  For example, easyEverything may have framed the introduction of responsive 
pricing in a way that was acceptable to consumers, a public relation exercise that Coke 
failed.  We cannot address this issue either, because there is no variation in framing in our 
case study.   
With all of this in mind, an implication of our work is that even if the initial introduction 
of price variation decreases demand, once price variation has been introduced there may not 
be any further negative demand responses from further increases in price variation.  This 
suggests that one should observe that firms either do not vary prices at all or vary prices a 
lot, an observation that seems consistent with casual observations from the airline industry, 
and hotel industry, for example.   
  28 
5 Summary 
This work develops a framework to study whether consumers care about how much a 
seller varies prices in the presence of demand fluctuations.  Are consumers antagonized by 
pricing policies that vary prices more?  Or do increases in price variation increase demand?  
What is the trade-off between the amount of price variations consumers face and the level of 
demand?   
We find that aggregate demand depends positively on price variability, holding all other 
dimensions of the pricing rule constant. The positive response disappears when we allow for 
demand heterogeneity across hours, suggesting that this response was due to an aggregation 
effect over hourly demands.  We also compare the demand under peak load pricing and 
responsive pricing.  Survey evidence suggests that consumers are more likely to be 
antagonized by responsive pricing, since it varies prices not only over the day cycle but also 
as a function of unpredictable demand shocks; also in this case, however, we find that 
demand is higher under responsive pricing. We interpret this result as an aggregation effect 
due to different demand elasticities in different demand realizations.   
To conclude, we want to emphasize that the framework presented in section 2 is general 
and that it can be applied elsewhere. We argue that varying price as a function of demand 
may influence demand through several channels, including the antagonism channel 
emphasized in the behavioral literature, and we propose to measure the net impact of these 
responses as a simple the trade-off.  This work establishes a first step toward understanding 
how consumer demand depends on the rule governing how prices are set.
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  31FIGURE 1 
Examples of responsive pricing functions 



















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 1  170  0  0.44 3.00  0.17 
Peak-load   2  72  0  0.48 5.17  9.06 
 3 94  0  0.53 5.15  1.26 
Pricing 4  217  0  0.55 5.73  3.60 
 5  126  0  0.51 7.44  8.43 
 6  132 10.73  0.55  7.75  10.97 
 7  166 12.24  0.52  8.69  13.90 
 8  336 15.10  0.53  9.59  19.38 
 9  304 15.14  0.50  10.16  18.28 
Responsive 10  268 16.09  0.48  11.09  15.59 
 11  344 15.54  0.45  11.59  16.41 
Pricing 12  667 12.67  0.40  13.02  12.45 
 13  518 14.08  0.41  12.36  29.16 
 14  291 17.27  0.45  12.22  28.93 
 15  135 33.72  0.45  14.02  48.73 
 16  168 32.78  0.44  14.16  54.48 
 17  135 41.88  0.41  14.76  57.50 
 All 
regimes  4,143 17.11 0.46  10.67  28.73 
 
 
  32 TABLE 2 
Baseline Results 
  (1)   (2)  
Price index (pj) -1.120***   
  (0.267)  
Price Variance (σ)  0.097** 0.006 
  (0.048) (0.020) 
Price 0-1 am    -1.940*** 
   (0.288) 
Price 1-2 am    -2.184*** 
   (0.326) 
Price 2-3 am    -3.430*** 
   (0.565) 
Price 3-4 am    -3.545*** 
   (0.477) 
Price 4-5 am    -4.128*** 
   (0.528) 
Price 5-6 pm    -3.608*** 
   (0.413) 
Price 6-7 am    -2.842*** 
   (0.308) 
Price 7-8 am    -0.872*** 
   (0.139) 
Price 8-9 am    -1.587*** 
   (0.196) 
Price 9-10 am    -2.803*** 
   (0.273) 
Price 10-11 am    -2.949*** 
   (0.288) 
Price 11-12 am    -2.092*** 
   (0.227) 
Price 12 am-1 pm    -1.618*** 
   (0.211) 
Price 1-2 pm    -1.429*** 
   (0.210) 
Price 2-3 pm    -1.507*** 
   (0.218) 
Price 3-4 pm    -0.734*** 
   (0.156) 
Price 4-5 pm    -0.409*** 
   (0.140) 
Price 5-6 pm    -0.403*** 
   (0.126) 
Price 6-7 pm    -0.286** 
   (0.121) 
Price 7-8 pm    -0.609*** 
   (0.161) 
Price 8-9 pm    -0.818*** 
   (0.162) 
Price 9-10 pm    -1.096*** 
   (0.165) 
Price 10-11 pm    -1.071*** 
   (0.165) 
Price 11-12 pm    -1.278*** 
   (0.198) 
Centered R
2 0.03 0.87 
Observations  4,143 4,143 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean occupancy rate x 100. Price denotes the average price (computed by hour and regime). Price level 
and price variance are treated as endogenous. Coefficients are estimated using instrumental variables. Instruments are the slope and the 
intercept of the pricing functions and their squares (interacted with hour indicator variables in column 2). Day-of-the-week fixed effects 
(Tuesday to Sunday, Monday omitted), National Holiday fixed effect and a constant are included in both specifications. Hour specific fixed 
effects (omitted 8-9 am) and weekend cycle fixed effects are included in column 2. Robust standard errors (clustered by observation day) are 
reported in parentheses. 
  33TABLE 3 
Direct Response to Pricing Rule 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
Price index (pj) -1.192***  -2.109***   
  (0.207) (0.441)   
Responsive Pricing Fixed Effect  4.226**  7.646***  4.470*** 
  (2.081) (2.588) (1.385) 
Price Variance (σ)   0.184***  -0.027 
   (0.059)  (0.019) 
Price 0-1 am      -2.388*** 
     (0.226) 
Price 1-2 am      -2.657*** 
     (0.255) 
Price 2-3 am      -4.026*** 
     (0.525) 
Price 3-4 am      -4.057*** 
     (0.453) 
Price 4-5 am      -4.466*** 
     (0.541) 
Price 5-6 pm      -3.845*** 
     (0.425) 
Price 6-7 am      -3.097*** 
     (0.325) 
Price 7-8 am      -1.020*** 
     (0.130) 
Price 8-9 am      -1.844*** 
     (0.193) 
Price 9-10 am      -3.178*** 
     (0.260) 
Price 10-11 am      -3.356*** 
     (0.263) 
Price 11-12 am      -2.444*** 
     (0.217) 
Price 12 am-1 pm      -1.946*** 
     (0.207) 
Price 1-2 pm      -1.706*** 
     (0.195) 
Price 2-3 pm      -1.747*** 
     (0.206) 
Price 3-4 pm      -0.934*** 
     (0.142) 
Price 4-5 pm      -0.584*** 
     (0.133) 
Price 5-6 pm      -0.593*** 
     (0.123) 
Price 6-7 pm      -0.477*** 
     (0.115) 
Price 7-8 pm      -0.805*** 
     (0.147) 
Price 8-9 pm      -1.022*** 
     (0.147) 
Price 9-10 pm      -1.326*** 
     (0.149) 
Price 10-11 pm      -1.313*** 
     (0.145) 
Price 11-12 pm      -1.575*** 
     (0.176) 
Centered R
2 0.03 0.04 0.87 
Observations 4,143  4,143  4,143 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean occupancy rate x 100. Price denotes the average price (computed by hour and regime). Price level 
and price variance are treated as endogenous. Coefficients are estimated using instrumental variables. Instruments are the slope and the 
intercept of the pricing functions and their squares (interacted with hour indicator variables in column 3). Day-of-the-week fixed effects 
(Tuesday to Sunday, Monday omitted), National Holiday fixed effect and a constant are included in all specifications. Hour specific fixed 
effects (omitted 8-9 am) and weekend cycle fixed effects are included in column 3. Robust standard errors (clustered by observation day) are 
reported in parentheses.  
  34TABLE 4 
Different Sources of Price Variability 
 (1)  (2) 
Price index (pj) -1.072***   
 (0.322)   
Price Variance (Responsive Pricing)  0.106**  0.032 
 (0.051)  (0.024) 
Price Variance (Peak Load Pricing)  0.276  0.320 
 (0.263)  (0.278) 
Price 0-1 am    -1.871*** 
   (0.277) 
Price 1-2 am    -2.113*** 
   (0.320) 
Price 2-3 am    -3.358*** 
   (0.568) 
Price 3-4 am    -3.491*** 
   (0.491) 
Price 4-5 am    -4.070*** 
   (0.541) 
Price 5-6 pm    -3.534*** 
   (0.422) 
Price 6-7 am    -2.769*** 
   (0.320) 
Price 7-8 am    -0.841*** 
   (0.141) 
Price 8-9 am    -1.560*** 
   (0.198) 
Price 9-10 am    -2.776*** 
   (0.280) 
Price 10-11 am    -2.912*** 
   (0.304) 
Price 11-12 am    -2.054*** 
   (0.240) 
Price 12 am-1 pm    -1.577*** 
   (0.221) 
Price 1-2 pm    -1.411*** 
   (0.209) 
Price 2-3 pm    -1.495*** 
   (0.225) 
Price 3-4 pm    -0.739*** 
   (0.158) 
Price 4-5 pm    -0.434*** 
   (0.140) 
Price 5-6 pm    -0.418*** 
   (0.126) 
Price 6-7 pm    -0.301** 
   (0.121) 
Price 7-8 pm    -0.613*** 
   (0.160) 
Price 8-9 pm    -0.814*** 
   (0.161) 
Price 9-10 pm    -1.086*** 
   (0.166) 
Price 10-11 pm    -1.062*** 
   (0.163) 
Price 11-12 pm    -1.257*** 
   (0.197) 
Centered R
2 0.03 0.87 
Observations 4,143  4,143 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean occupancy rate x 100. Price denotes the average price (computed by hour and regime). Price level 
and price variance are treated as endogenous. Coefficients are estimated using instrumental variables. Instruments are the slope and the 
intercept of the pricing functions and their squares (interacted with hour indicator variables in column 3). Day-of-the-week fixed effects 
(Tuesday to Sunday, Monday omitted), National Holiday fixed effect and a constant are included in all specifications. Hour specific fixed 
effects (omitted 8-9 am) and weekend cycle fixed effects are included in column 2. Robust standard errors (clustered by observation day) are 
reported in parentheses. 
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Robustness Results (Substitution Effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Total Price Variance (σ)  0.039 0.090***   
 (0.034)  (0.033)   
Substitution (Peak/ Off-peak)  ( )  h j p ,
~ -0.213 -0.925*** -0.167 
  (0.170) (0.182) (0.203) 
Responsive Pricing Fixed Effect    8.626***   
   (1.662)  
Price Variance (Responsive Pricing)      0.057 
     (0.035) 
Price Variance (Peak Load Pricing)      0.299 
     (0.297) 
Price 0-1 am  -1.754***  -2.021***  -1.744*** 
  (0.216) (0.203) (0.207) 
Price 1-2 am  -1.996***  -2.304***  -1.986*** 
  (0.238) (0.228) (0.232) 
Price 2-3 am  -3.155***  -3.440***  -3.170*** 
  (0.447) (0.446) (0.451) 
Price 3-4 am  -3.257***  -3.310***  -3.286*** 
  (0.388) (0.375) (0.393) 
Price 4-5 am  -3.891***  -3.783***  -3.899*** 
  (0.500) (0.465) (0.507) 
Price 5-6 pm  -3.424***  -3.285***  -3.399*** 
  (0.409) (0.378) (0.412) 
Price 6-7 am  -2.648***  -2.516***  -2.628*** 
  (0.313) (0.281) (0.316) 
Price 7-8 am  -0.764***  -0.688***  -0.759*** 
  (0.113) (0.108) (0.117) 
Price 8-9 am  -1.428***  -1.403***  -1.438*** 
  (0.156) (0.159) (0.149) 
Price 9-10 am  -2.582***  -2.584***  -2.611*** 
  (0.224) (0.235) (0.214) 
Price 10-11 am  -2.728***  -2.795***  -2.750*** 
  (0.197) (0.200) (0.189) 
Price 11-12 am  -2.103***  -2.841***  -2.075*** 
  (0.232) (0.253) (0.259) 
Price 12 am-1 pm  -1.638***  -2.354***  -1.604*** 
  (0.221) (0.247) (0.244) 
Price 1-2  pm  -1.454***  -2.083***  -1.439*** 
  (0.224) (0.240) (0.233) 
Price 2-3  pm  -1.534***  -2.104***  -1.524*** 
  (0.234) (0.255) (0.253) 
Price 3-4  pm  -0.739***  -1.152***  -0.750*** 
  (0.160) (0.172) (0.169) 
Price 4-5  pm  -0.413***  -0.772***  -0.441*** 
  (0.142) (0.154) (0.147) 
Price 5-6  pm  -0.412***  -0.820***  -0.430*** 
  (0.131) (0.148) (0.136) 
Price 6-7  pm  -0.298**  -0.720***  -0.316** 
  (0.127) (0.142) (0.133) 
Continued on next page 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
Price 7-8 pm  -0.630***  -1.094***  -0.636*** 
  (0.172) (0.175) (0.178) 
Price 8-9 pm  -0.840***  -1.322***  -0.839*** 
  (0.171) (0.165) (0.180) 
Price 9-10 pm  -1.118***  -1.651***  -1.113*** 
  (0.175) (0.170) (0.186) 
Price 10-11 pm  -1.092***  -1.644***  -1.088*** 
  (0.175) (0.171) (0.183) 
Price 11-12 pm  -1.138***  -1.258***  -1.159*** 
  (0.163) (0.166) (0.159) 
Centered R
2 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Observations  4,143 4,143 4,143 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean occupancy rate x 100. Price denotes the average price (computed by hour and regime);   is 
equal to the average off-peak price if   and the average peak price otherwise; prices and price variance are treated as endogenous. 
Coefficients are estimated using instrumental variables. Instruments are the slope and the intercept of the pricing functions and their squares 
(interacted with hour indicator variables). Day-of-the-week fixed effects (Tuesday to Sunday, Monday omitted), National Holiday, hour 
specific (omitted 8-9 am), weekend cycle fixed effects and a constant are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors (clustered by 
observation day) are reported in parentheses. 
h j p ,
~





Robustness Results (Aggregate Specification) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












Price index (pj) -1.706***  2.728***   -1.246***  -3.995***   
 (0.379)  (0.910)    (0.274)  (0.289)   
Price Standard 
Deviation  
2.174***          
 (0.707)           
Price index squared    -0.235***         
   (0.055)         
Price Variance    0.417***  0.002**  0.103**  0.417***  0.070* 
   (0.090)  (0.001)  (0.051)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Ln (Price index)      -0.220***       
     (0.058)       
Average Price            -1.237*** 
           (0.285) 
Centered R
2 0.04 0.05 0.02  0.04 0.05 0.03 
Observations 4,143  4,143 4,143 3,774 3,464  4,143 
Note: The data is comprised of 4,143 hourly observations in columns 1-3 and 6, of 3,774 observations in column 4 (observations within 24 
hours from a regime change are excluded), and of 3,464 in column 5 (responsive pricing regimes only). The price index, price index squared, 
price variance and price standard deviation are treated as endogenous. Coefficients are estimated using instrumental variables. Instruments are 
the slope and the intercept of the pricing functions and their squares. Day-of-the-week fixed effects (Tuesday to Sunday, Monday omitted), 
National Holiday fixed effect and a constant are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors (clustered by observation day) are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
  37TABLE 7 
Robustness Results (Disaggregate Specification) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 













Price Standard Deviation   0.356           
 (0.236)           
Price Variance    0.018  0.001  0.006  -0.018  0.167*** 
   (0.025)  (0.001)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.044) 
Price 0-1 am  -2.058***  -1.301  -0.045***  -2.061***  -2.982***  0.034 
 (0.263)  (1.373)  (0.006)  (0.316)  (0.490)  (0.407) 
Price 1-2 am  -2.313***  5.398**  -0.054***  -2.365***  -7.021***  -2.435*** 
 (0.293)  (2.199)  (0.007)  (0.360)  (0.732)  (0.639) 
Price 2-3 am  -3.554***  0.962  -0.098***  -3.576***  -3.595***  -2.229*** 
 (0.552)  (2.638)  (0.015)  (0.601)  (0.510)  (0.377) 
Price 3-4 am  -3.685***  1.821  -0.118***  -3.638***  -5.109***  -3.040*** 
 (0.464)  (2.397)  (0.016)  (0.504)  (0.546)  (0.404) 
Price 4-5 am  -4.204***  -5.508*  -0.161***  -4.201***  -4.482***  -2.882*** 
 (0.540)  (3.103)  (0.021)  (0.542)  (0.540)  (0.395) 
Price 5-6 pm  -3.657***  -9.996***  -0.172***  -3.694***  -3.646***  -2.359*** 
 (0.426)  (3.585)  (0.020)  (0.414)  (0.392)  (0.288) 
Price 6-7 am  -2.896***  -6.166**  -0.181***  -2.959***  -3.037***  -1.680*** 
 (0.323)  (2.822)  (0.020)  (0.306)  (0.304)  (0.219) 
Price 7-8 am  -0.901***  1.374  -0.056***  -1.023***  -1.240***  -0.244** 
 (0.133)  (0.901)  (0.009)  (0.140)  (0.122)  (0.106) 
Price 8-9 am  -1.638***  2.913  -0.081***  -1.746***  -1.830***  -0.495*** 
 (0.195)  (1.970)  (0.010)  (0.200)  (0.202)  (0.153) 
Price 9-10 am  -2.923***  -9.268***  -0.098***  -2.975***  -2.896***  -0.826*** 
 (0.263)  (3.071)  (0.009)  (0.251)  (0.256)  (0.252) 
Price 10-11 am  -3.115***  -3.432  -0.078***  -3.089***  -3.906***  -1.538*** 
 (0.270)  (2.187)  (0.007)  (0.282)  (0.345)  (0.305) 
Price 11-12 am  -2.245***  -1.928*  -0.047***  -2.221***  -3.142***  -1.664*** 
 (0.218)  (1.085)  (0.005)  (0.239)  (0.388)  (0.279) 
Price 12 am-1 pm  -1.761***  -1.615*  -0.035***  -1.708***  -2.070***  -1.013*** 
 (0.205)  (0.950)  (0.004)  (0.211)  (0.305)  (0.238) 
Price 1-2 pm  -1.560***  -1.317  -0.028***  -1.593***  -1.859***  -0.979*** 
 (0.199)  (0.859)  (0.004)  (0.206)  (0.256)  (0.207) 
Price 2-3 pm  -1.628***  -1.011  -0.027***  -1.739***  -1.978***  -1.161*** 
 (0.207)  (0.870)  (0.004)  (0.197)  (0.245)  (0.220) 
Price 3-4 pm  -0.825***  1.827***  -0.012***  -0.837***  -1.545***  -0.597*** 
 (0.144)  (0.608)  (0.002)  (0.134)  (0.186)  (0.203) 
Price 4-5 pm  -0.493***  1.458***  -0.007***  -0.430***  -1.039***  -0.207 
 (0.133)  (0.516)  (0.002)  (0.156)  (0.147)  (0.173) 
Price 5-6 pm  -0.495***  0.649  -0.008***  -0.366**  -0.904***  -0.132 
 (0.121)  (0.486)  (0.002)  (0.143)  (0.169)  (0.182) 
Price 6-7 pm  -0.380***  0.686  -0.006***  -0.280**  -0.908***  -0.144 
 (0.114)  (0.452)  (0.002)  (0.140)  (0.149)  (0.142) 
Price 7-8 pm  -0.712***  -0.931  -0.011***  -0.667***  -0.818***  -0.167 
 (0.152)  (0.639)  (0.003)  (0.161)  (0.168)  (0.147) 
Price 8-9 pm  -0.914***  -1.591***  -0.014***  -0.924***  -0.642***  -0.020 
 (0.154)  (0.530)  (0.003)  (0.162)  (0.158)  (0.128) 
Price 9-10 pm  -1.199***  -1.822***  -0.020***  -1.119***  -0.945***  -0.232 
 (0.157)  (0.565)  (0.003)  (0.188)  (0.192)  (0.158) 
Price 10-11 pm  -1.179***  -1.051*  -0.021***  -1.113***  -1.130***  -0.327* 
 (0.152)  (0.588)  (0.003)  (0.184)  (0.213)  (0.194) 
Price 11-12 pm  -1.399***  0.689  -0.028***  -1.326***  -2.250***  -0.952*** 
 (0.182)  (0.845)  (0.003)  (0.220)  (0.341)  (0.304) 
Continued on next page 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Squared 0-1 am    -0.043         
   (0.084)        
Price Squared 1-2 am    -0.546***         
   (0.156)        
Price Squared 2-3 am    -0.327*         
   (0.187)        
Price Squared 3-4 am    -0.475**         
   (0.208)        
Price Squared 4-5 am    0.113         
   (0.251)        
Price Squared 5-6 pm    0.533*         
   (0.300)        
Price Squared 6-7 am    0.277         
   (0.234)        
Price Squared 7-8 am    -0.161**         
   (0.062)        
Price Squared 8-9 am    -0.286**         
   (0.121)        
Price Squared 9-10 am    0.384**         
   (0.172)        
Price Squared 10-11 am    0.024         
   (0.120)        
Price Squared 11-12 am    -0.010         
   (0.051)        
Price Squared 12am-1pm    -0.002         
   (0.040)        
Price Squared 1-2 pm    -0.007         
   (0.032)        
Price Squared 2-3 pm    -0.021         
   (0.030)        
Price Squared 3-4 pm    -0.095***         
   (0.021)        
Price Squared 4-5pm    -0.067***         
   (0.017)        
Price Squared 5-6 pm    -0.039**         
   (0.016)        
Price Squared 6-7 pm    -0.036**         
   (0.015)        
Price Squared 7-8 pm    0.011         
   (0.020)        
Price Squared 8-9 pm    0.031*         
   (0.018)        
Price Squared 9-10 pm    0.031         
   (0.021)        
Price Squared 10-11 pm    -0.002         
   (0.023)        
Price Squared 11-12 pm    -0.103***         
   (0.040)        
Trend  (week)        -1.338*** 
        (0.341) 
Trend
2       0.018 
        (0.011) 
Centered R
2 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.92 
Observations 4,143  4,143 4,143 3,774 3,464 3,464 
Note: The data is comprised of 4,143 hourly observations in columns 1-3, of 3,774 observations in column 4 (observations within 24 hours 
from a regime change are excluded), and of 3,464 in columns 5 and 6 (responsive pricing regimes only). Price denotes the average price 
(computed by hour and regime). The price, price squared, price variance and price standard deviation are treated as endogenous. Coefficients 
are estimated using instrumental variables. Instruments are the slope and the intercept of the pricing functions and their squares (interacted 
with hour indicator variables). Day-of-the-week fixed effects (Tuesday to Sunday, Monday omitted), National Holiday, hour specific (omitted 
8-9 am) and weekend cycle fixed effects, and a constant are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors (clustered by observation 
day) are reported in parentheses. 
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TABLE A1 
Price Increase Between Adjacent Hours 
Regime  Average price increase 
between adjacent hours
Variance of price increases 
between adjacent hours 
6 1.33  0.46 
7 1.40  1.16 
8 1.54  1.76 
9 1.46  1.55 
10 1.47  1.99 
11 1.63  3.17 
12 1.38  3.68 
13 2.13  6.84 
14 2.05  5.44 
15 2.34  3.27 
16 2.24  1.92 







Note: Define the price difference between adjacent hours as di=pi-pi-1 , and the number of price 
increases across hours as I
+. The first column of the table reports  ) 0 | ( ) / 1 ( > = ∑
+
i i i d d I d , 
the second  ∑ > −
+ 2 ) 0 | ( ) / 1 ( i i i d d d I . 
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TABLE A2 
Tests for Equality of Variance of Price (F-tests) 
Regime  1 2 3 4 5  6  7  8  9  10 
2  0.019 
(.00) 
      
 
     




           






         








       
6  0.015 
(.00) 








      












     












0.717   
(.02) 
    


















































































































































































Regime  11 12 13  14 15  16 
12  1.318 
(.00) 
       




      






    
































Note: The test is the ratio of the variance of price for the column regime and the 
row regime. The degrees of freedom (N1-1, N2-1) can be computed for each test 
using the number of observations for each regime in Table 1. P-values are 
reported in parenthesis.  
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TABLE A3 
First Stage Regression Results 
 (1)  (2) 
  Price index (pj)  Price Variance (σ) 
Responsiveness (β)  0.514*** 0.822*** 
 (0.013)  (0.076) 
Level of the pricing function (α)  0.656*** 1.955** 
 (0.096)  (0.805) 
Responsiveness Squared (β
2)  -0.003*** 0.020*** 
 (0.000)  (0.003) 
Level of the pricing function squared (α
2)  -0.003 -0.099 
 (0.008)  (0.073) 
Observations 4143  4143 
R-squared 0.97  0.87 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments  0.96  0.86 
Note: Day-of-the-week fixed effects (Tuesday to Sunday, Monday omitted), National Holiday fixed effect and a 
constant are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors (clustered by observation day) are reported in 
parentheses. Robust standard errors (clustered by observation day) are reported in parentheses.  
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